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ON MEAN FIELD GAMES MODELS FOR EXHAUSTIBLE COMMODITIES
TRADE
P. JAMESON GRABER AND CHARAFEDDINE MOUZOUNI
ABSTRACT. We investigate a mean field game model for the production of exhaustible re-
sources. In this model, firms produce comparable goods, strategically set their production
rate in order to maximise profit, and leave the market as soon as they deplete their ca-
pacities. We examine the related Mean Field Game system and prove well-posedness for
initial measure data by deriving suitable a priori estimates. Then, we show that feedback
strategies which are computed from the Mean Field Game system provide ε-Nash equi-
libria to the corresponding N-Player Cournot game, for large values of N. This is done
by showing tightness of the empirical process in the Skorokhod M1 topology, which is
defined for distribution-valued processes.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since its introduction about ten years ago, the theory of the Mean Field Games has ex-
panded tremendously, and has become an important tool in the study of dynamical and
equilibrium behavior of large systems. The theory was introduced separately by a series
of seminal papers by Lasry and Lions [27–29] and Caines et al. [4, 5], and in lectures by
Pierre-Louis Lions at the Colle`ge de France, which were video-taped and made available
on the internet [32]. The main idea is inspired from statistical physics literature, and con-
sists in considering that a given player interacts with competitors through their statistical
distribution in the space of possible states.
Mean Field Games (MFG) theory provides a methodology to produce approximate
Nash equilibria for stochastic differential games with symmetric interactions and a large
(but finite) number of players N. In these games, the exact equilibrium strategies could
be determined by a system of coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations, derived from
the dynamic programming principle. However, the dimension of the system in general
increases in N, which makes this system extremely hard to solve either analytically or
numerically, especially for large values of N. The Mean Field Game approach simplifies
the modelling, and allows to compute an approximation of Nash equilibria by solving a
system of two forward-backward coupled PDEs. This simplification justifies partly the
interest in the MFG modelling for several applications.
In this paper we revisit a family of MFG models related to competing producers with
exhaustible resources. The dynamic market evolution is driven by the use of certain exist-
ing reserves to produce and trade comparable goods. Producers disappear from market
as soon as they exhaust their capacities, so that the fraction of remaining firms decreases
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over time. This type of model was first introduced by Gue´ant, Lasry, and Lions [22], and
addressed also by Chan and Sircar in [13], where it is referred to as “Bertrand & Cournot
Mean Field Games.” In [14], the same authors use a similar MFG modelling approach, to
discuss recent changes in global oil market. A more sophisticated model for the energy
industry is proposed recently in [33], where producers have also the possibility to explore
new resources to replenish their reserves.
From amathematical standpoint, Bertrand&CournotMFG system consists in a system
of a backward Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation to model a representative firm’s
value function, coupled with a forward Fokker-Planck equation to model the evolution
of the distribution of the active firms’ states. The exhaustibility condition gives rise to
absorbing boundary conditions at zero. A rigorous analysis of this system was provided
in [21], where authors show existence of smooth solutions to the system of equations,
and uniqueness under a certain restriction. Unconditional uniqueness is proved in [20],
in addition to the analysis of the case with Neumann boundary conditions.
Otherwise, very little is known so far on the rigorous link between the so called Bertrand
& Cournot MFG models, and the corresponding N-Player Bertrand-Cournot stochastic
differential games. Indeed, the classical theory cannot be applied to this specific case for
two main reasons: on the one hand, because of the absorbing boundary conditions; and
on the other hand, because in our model players are coupled through their controls, and
therefore belongs to the class of extended Mean Field Games (cf. [3, 10, 18, 19]). This has
motivated the present work, in which we analyse rigorously this question for Cournot
competition.
We investigate the mean-field approximation for N-Player continuous-time Cournot
game with linear price schedule, and exhaustible resources. In this context, the produc-
ers’ state variable is the reserves level, and the strategic variable is the rate of production.
Producers disappear from the market as soon as they deplete their reserves, and the re-
maining active producers are constrained to set a non-negative rate of production, in
order to manage their remaining reserves and maximize sales profit. Due to this con-
straint on the production rate – which is natural from a modeling view point – we obtain
a Hamiltonian function that is less regular in comparison to [13, 20, 21]. Market demand
is assumed to be linear, so that the received market price is a non-increasing linear func-
tion of the total production across all producers. Further details and explanations about
the model will be given in Section 1.2.
We start by studying the resulting system of coupled PDEs (the MFG system) by de-
riving suitable a priori estimates in Ho¨lder spaces. We shall assume that the initial data
is a probability measure that is supported on (0,L], for some L > 0, which entails that all
producers start with positive reserves. Hence, our analysis completes that which is found
in [20, 21], by treating the case of a less regular Hamiltonian function and initial measure
data. Next, we prove that the feedback control given by the solution of the Mean Field
Game system provides an ε-Nash equilibrium (cf. Definition 1.3) to the corresponding
N-Player Cournot game, where the error ε is arbitrary small for large enough N. This
result shows that the MFG model is indeed a good approximation to the game with
finitely many players, and reinforces numerical methods based on the MFG approach.
As in the classical theory, the key argument in the proof of this result is a suitable law
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of large numbers. In our context, the main mathematical challenge comes from the fact
that agents interact through the boundary behaviour, and are coupled by means of their
chosen production strategies. To prove a tailor-made law of large numbers, we employ a
compactness method borrowed from [23, 30], by showing tightness of the empirical pro-
cess in the space of distribution valued ca`dla`g processes, endowed with Skorokhod’s M1
topology [30]. In contrast to the classical tools used so far, this method does not provide
an exact quantification of the error ε, which is its main downside. Nevertheless, this
approach has proven to be convenient for studying systems with absorbing boundary
conditions. We also believe that it could be extended to the case of a systemic common
noise, just as [30] contains an analysis of a stochastic McKean-Vlasov equation. However,
we do not address this case here, finding the analysis of the stochastic HJB/FP-system
somewhat out of reach under our assumptions on the data (cf. [9, Section 4] and the
hypotheses found there).
For background on Skorokhod’s topologies for real valued processes, we refer the
reader to [38] and references therein. The M1 topology is extended to the space of tem-
pered distributions, and to more general spaces in [30]. The fact that the feedback MFG
control provides ε-Nash equilibria for the corresponding differential games with a large
(but finite) number of players, was first noticed by Caines et al. [4, 5] and further de-
veloped in several works (see e.g. [11, 25] among many others). Cournot games with
exhaustible resources and finite number of agents is investigated by Harris et al. in [24],
and the correspondingMFGmodels were studied in [13,14,22,33] with different variants,
and numerical simulations. We refer the reader to [3,12,22,29] for further background on
Mean Field Game theory.
The paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section, we give some tech-
nical notations and preliminaries, introduce themathematical description of theN-Player
Cournot game with limited resources and the correspondingMean Field Game, and state
the main results of this paper. In Section 2 we prove existence and uniqueness of regu-
lar solutions to the MFG system by deriving suitable Ho¨lder estimates. In Section 3 we
show that the feedback control computed from the MFG system is an ε-Nash equilib-
rium to theN-Player game. For that purpose, we start by showing the weak convergence
of the empirical process with respect to the M1 topology, then we deduce the main re-
sult by recalling the interpretation of the MFG system in terms of games with mean-field
interactions.
1.1. Notations and preliminaries. Throughout this article we fix L > 0, define Q :=
(0,L), and QT := (0, T) × (0,L). For any domain D in R or R
2 we define D¯ to be the
closure of D, Ls(D), 1 6 s 6 ∞ to be the Lebesgue space of s-integrable functions on D;
Ls(D)+ to be the set of elements w ∈ L
s(D) such that w(x) > 0 for a.e. x ∈ D; Wks (D),
k ∈ N, 1 6 s 6 ∞, to be the Sobolev space of functions having a weak derivatives up to
order k which are s-summable on D; C(D) to be the space of all continuous functions on
D; C0(D) to be the space of all continuous functions onD that vanish at infinity (C0(D) =
C(D)whenD is compact); Cθ(D) to be the space of all Ho¨lder continuous functions with
exponent θ on D; C∞c (D) to be the set of smooth functions whose support is a compact
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included in D; SR denotes the space of rapidly decreasing functions, and S
′
R the space of
tempered distributions.
For a subset D ⊂ QT , we also define C
1,2(D) to be the set of all functions on D which
are locally continuously differentiable in t and twice locally continuously differentiable
in x, and byW1,2s (D) the space of elements of L
s(D) having weak derivatives of the form
∂
j
t∂
k
x with 2j + k 6 2, endowed with the following norm:
‖w‖
W
1,2
s
:=
∑
2j+k62
‖∂jt∂
k
xw‖Ls .
The space of R-valued Radon measures on D is denoted M(D), which we identify with
C0(D)
∗ endowed with weak∗ topology, and P(D), P˜(D) are respectively the convex sub-
set of probability measures onD, and the convex subset of sub-probability measures: that
is the set of positive radon measures µ, s.t. µ(D) 6 1. For any measure µ ∈ M(D), we
denote by supp(µ) the support of µ.
Throughout the paper, we fix a complete filtered probability space (Ω,F,F = (Ft)t>0,P),
and suppose that is rich enough to fulfill the assumptions that will be formulated in this
article. We also fix constants r,σ, T > 0, and denote by C a generic constant whose precise
value may change from line to line. We also use the notation C(α,β,γ) and the like to
point out the dependence of some constant on parameters α,β,γ. Moreover, we use the
notation X ∼ µ to define a random variable X with law µ. For any R-valued function w
we define the positive and negative parts of w, respectively:
w+ :=
1
2
(|w| +w), and w− :=
1
2
(|w| −w);
and for any x,y ∈ R we use the following notation for the minimum and maximum,
respectively:
x∧ y :=
1
2
(x+ y− |x− y|) ; and x∨ y :=
1
2
(x+ y+ |x − y|) .
Let us recall a few basic facts on stochastic differential equation with reflecting bound-
ary in a half-line. Given a random variable V that is supported on (−∞,L], we look for a
pair of a.s. continuous and adapted processes (Xt)t>0 and (ξ
X
t )t>0 such that:
Xt = V +
∫t
0
b(s,Xs)ds+ σWt −
∫ t
0
1{Xs=L} dξ
X
s ∈ (−∞,L],
ξXt =
∫t
0
1{Xs=L} dξ
X
s ,(1.1a)
X0 = V , ξ
X
0 = 0, and ξ
X is nondecreasing,
where (Wt)t>0 is a F-Wiener process that is independent of V . The random process
(Xt)t>0 is the reflected diffusion, (ξ
X
t )t>0 is the local time, and the above set of equations is
called the Skorokhod problem. Throughout the paper, we shall write problem (1.1a) in the
following simple form:
dXt = b(t,Xt)dt+ σdWt − dξ
X
t , X0 = V .
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Suppose that the function b is bounded, and satisfies for some K > 0 the following con-
dition:
(1.1b) |b(t, x) − b(t,y)| 6 K|x− y|
for all t ∈ [0, T ], and x,y ∈ (−∞,L]. Then, it is well-known (see e.g. [1, 15]) that under
these conditions, problem (1.1a) has a unique solution on [0, T ]. Moreover, this solution
is given explicitly by:
(1.1c) Xt := Γt(Y), ξ
X
t := Yt − Γt(Y);
where the process (Yt)t∈[0,T ] is the solution to
(1.1d) Yt = V +
∫t
0
b(s, Γs(Y))ds + σWt,
and where Γ is the so called Skorokhod map, that is given by
Γt(Y) := Yt − sup
06s6t
(L − Ys)
−
.
Furthermore, notice that
(1.1e) ξXt − ξ
X
t+h > inf
v∈[0,h]
(Yt − Yt+v)
for any t ∈ [0, T) and h ∈ (0, T − t). In fact, when ξXt < ξ
X
t+h, then
0 < ξXt+h := sup
06s6t+h
(L− Ys)
−
= sup
t6s6t+h
(L− Ys)
−
= (Yv0 − L)
for some t 6 v0 6 t+ h. Therefore
ξXt − ξ
X
t+h = sup
06s6t
(L− Ys)
−
− sup
06s6t+h
(L− Ys)
−
> (Yt − L) − (Yv0 − L) > inf
v∈[0,h]
(Yt − Yt+v).
This entails (1.1e) since the last inequality still holds when ξXt = ξ
X
t+h.
Now we consider a boundary value problem for the Fokker-Planck equation. Let b in
L2(QT ),m0 ∈ P(Q¯), and consider the following Fokker-Planck equation
(1.2a)

mt −
σ2
2
mxx − (bm)x = 0 in QT
m(0) = m0 in Q,
complemented with the following mixed boundary conditions:
(1.2b) m(t, 0) = 0, and
σ2
2
mx(t,L) + b(t,L)m(t,L) = 0 on (0, T).
Then we define a weak solution to (1.2a)-(1.2b) to be a function m ∈ L1(QT )+ such that
m|b|2 in L1(QT ), and
(1.2c)
∫T
0
∫L
0
m(−φt −
σ2
2
φxx + bφx)dx dt =
∫L
0
φ(0, .)dm0
for every φ ∈ C∞c ([0, T) ×Q) satisfying
(1.2d) φ(t, 0) = φx(t,L) = 0, ∀t ∈ (0, T)
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This is the definition given by Porretta in [35]. The only difference is that herewe consider
mixed boundary conditions and measure initial data.
Whenm0 ∈ L
1(Q)+, the problem (1.2a) endowedwith periodic, Dirichlet or Neumann
boundary conditions has several interesting features that were pointed out in [35, Sec-
tion 3]. In particular, they are unique [35, Corollary 3.5] and enjoy some extra regularity
[35, Proposition 3.10]. Note that these results still hold in the case of mixed boundary
conditions (1.2b). Throughout the paper, we shall use the results of [35, Section 3] for
(1.2a)-(1.2b).
In the case where b is bounded, we shall use the fact that (1.2a)-(1.2b) admits a unique
weak solution, for any m0 ∈ P(Q¯). In fact, one can construct a solution by considering
a suitable approximation ofm0, and then use the compactness results of [35, Proposition
3.10] in order to pass to the limit in L1(QT ). The uniqueness is obtained by considering
the dual equation, and using the same steps as for [35, Corollary 3.5] (cf. Proposition B.1).
1.2. Mathematical description of themodel andmain results. Let us now give a precise
description of the problems considered in this paper. Consider a market with N produc-
ers of a given good whose strategic variable is the rate of production, and where raw
materials are in limited supply. Concretely, one can think of energy producers that use
exhaustible resources, such as oil, to produce and sell energy. Firms disappear from the
market as soon as they deplete their reserves of raw materials.
Let us formalize this model in precise mathematical terms. Let
(
Wj
)
16j6N
be a family
of N independent F-Wiener processes on R, and consider the following system of Sko-
rokhod problems:
(1.3)
{
dXit = −q
i
t dt+ σdW
i
t − dξ
Xi
t ,
Xi0 = Vi, i = 1, ...,N.
Here (V1, ...,VN) is a vector of i.i.d and F0-measurable random variables, and we assume
that V1, ...,VN are independent ofW
1, ...,WN respectively. Let us fix a common horizon
T > 0, and set
τi := inf
{
t > 0 : Xit 6 0
}
∧ T .
The stopped random process
(
Xi
t∧τi
)
t∈[0,T ]
models the reserves level of the ith producer
on the horizon T , which is gradually depleted according to a non-negative controlled
rate of production
(
qit
)
t∈[0,T ]
. The stopping condition indicates that a firm can no longer
replenish its reserves once they are exhausted, and the Wiener processes in (1.3) model
the idiosyncratic fluctuations related to production. In addition, we consider L to be an
upper bound on the reserves level of any player. This latter assumption is also considered
in [20, 21] and is taken into account by considering reflected dynamics in (1.3). Since the
rate of production is always non-negative, note that reflection has practically no effect
when L is large compared to the initial reserves and σ.
Remark 1.1 (State constraints). Instead of reflecting boundary conditions, one could insist
upon a hard state constraint of the form Xit 6 L. Some recent work on MFG with state
constraints suggests this is possible [6–8], provided one correctly interprets the resulting
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system of PDE (the Fokker-Planck equation presents a special challenge). In this workwe
take a more classical approach, for which probabilistic tools are more readily available.
The producers interact through the market. We assume that demand is linear, so that
the price pi received by the firm i reads:
(1.4) pit = 1− (q
i
t + κq¯
i
t), where q¯
i
t =
1
N− 1
∑
j 6=i
qjt1t<τj , for 0 6 t 6 T .
Here κ > 0 expresses the degree of market interaction, in proportion to which abundant
total production will put downward pressure on all the prices. Note that only firms with
nonempty reserves at t ∈ [0, T ] are taken into account in (1.4). The other firms are no
longer present on the market. The producer i chooses a non-negative production rate qi
in order to maximize the following discounted profit functional:
Ji,Nc (q
1, ...,qN) := E
{∫T
0
e−rs
(
1− κq¯is − q
i
s
)
qis1s<τi ds+ e
−rTuT (X
i
τi)
}
,
where the terminal profituT is a smooth function satisfyinguT (0) = 0. Observe that firms
can no longer earn revenue as soon as they deplete their reserves. We refer to [14, 24] for
further explanations on the economic model and applications.
We denote by Ac the set of admissible controls for any player; that is the set of Mar-
kovian feedback controls, i.e. qit = q
i
(
t,X1t, ...,X
N
t
)
; such that (qit)t∈[0,T ] is non-negative,
satisfies
E
[∫T
0
|qis|
2
1s<τi ds
]
<∞,
and the ith equation of (1.3) is well-posed in the classical sense. Restriction to Markovian
controls rules out equilibria with undesirable properties such as non-credible threats (cf.
[16, Chapter 13]).
Now, we give a definition of Nash equilibria to this game:
Definition 1.2 (Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile
(
q1,∗, ...,qN,∗
)
in
∏N
i=1 Ac is aNash
equilibrium of theN-Player Cournot game, if for any i = 1, ...,N and qi ∈ Ac
Ji,Nc
(
qi; (qj,∗)j 6=i
)
6 Ji,Nc
(
q1,∗, ...,qN,∗
)
.
In words, a Nash equilibrium is a set of admissible strategies such that each player has
taken an optimal trajectory in view of the competitors’ choices.
The existence of Nash equilibria for the N-Player Cournot game with exhaustible re-
sources is addressed in [24]. In particular, the authors show the existence of a unique
Nash equilibrium in the static (one period) case, and studynumerically a specific duopoly
example by using a convenient asymptotic expansion. In general, the analysis of equilib-
ria for N-Player Cournot games is a challenging task both analytically and numerically,
especially when N is large. In the case of exhaustible resources, the dynamic program-
ming principle generates an even more complex PDE system because of the nonstandard
boundary conditions which are obtained (cf. [24, Section 3.1]).
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To remedy this problem several works have rather considered a Mean-Field model
[13,14,22,24,33] as an approximation to the initialN-Player game, whenN is large. More
precisely, we introduce the following:
Definition 1.3 (ε-Nash equilibrium). Let ε > 0, and let (qˆ1, ..., qˆN) be an admissible strat-
egy profile (i.e. an element of
∏N
i=1 Ac). We say (qˆ
1, ..., qˆN) provides an ε-Nash equilib-
rium to the game J1,Nc , ..., J
N,N
c provided that, for any i = 1, ...,N and q
i ∈ Ac,
Ji,Nc
(
qi; (qˆj)j 6=i
)
6 ε+ Ji,Nc
(
qˆ1, ..., qˆN
)
.
In words, an ε-Nash equilibrium is a set of admissible strategies such that each player
has taken an almost optimal trajectory in view of the competitors’ choices, where ε mea-
sures the distance from optimality.
To construct ε-Nash equilibria, we turn to the corresponding mean field problem. Let
us now consider a continuum of agents, producing and selling comparable goods. At
time t = 0, all the players have a positive capacity x ∈ (0,L], and are distributed on (0,L]
according tom0.
The remaining capacity (or reserves) of any atomic producer with a production rate
(ρ)t>0 depletes according to
dX
ρ
t = −ρt1t<τρ dt+ σ1t<τρ dWt − dξ
Xρ
t ,
where
τρ := inf{t > 0 : X
ρ
t 6 0} ∧ T ,
and (Wt)t∈[0,T ] is a F-Wiener process. A generic player which anticipates the total pro-
duction q¯ expects to receive the price
p := 1− (κq¯ + ρ)
and solves the following optimization problem:
(1.5) max
ρ>0
Jc(ρ) := max
ρ>0
E
{∫T
0
e−rs (1− κq¯s − ρs) ρs1s<τρ ds+ e
−rTuT
(
X
ρ
T
)}
.
The maximum in (1.5) is taken over all F-adapted and non-negative processes (ρt)t∈[0,T ]
such that
E
[∫T
0
|ρs|
2
1s<τρ ds
]
<∞
and (Xρt )t∈[0,T ] exists in the classical sense.
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According to MFG theory, the equilibrium in this setting can be computed by solving
the following coupled system of parabolic partial differential equations:
(1.6)


ut +
σ2
2
uxx − ru+ q
2
u,m = 0 in QT ,
mt −
σ2
2
mxx − {qu,mm}x = 0 in QT ,
m(t, 0) = 0, u(t, 0) = 0, ux(t,L) = 0 in (0, T),
m(0) = m0, u(T , x) = uT (x), in [0,L],
σ2
2
mx + qu,mm = 0 in (0, T) × {L},
where the function qu,m involved in the system is given by:
(1.7) qu,m(t, x) :=
1
2
(1− κq¯(t) − ux(t, x))
+
, where q¯(t) :=
∫L
0
qu,m(t, x)m(t, x)dx,
and κ > 0. Here m is the density of a continuum of market actors, qu,m(t, x) is the
optimal production rate of an atomic player with reserves x at time t, and u is the the
game value function of an atomic player following the production policy qu,m.
Let us assume thatuT is a function in C
2(Q¯), such that the first derivative ofuT denoted
by u′T fulfils
(H1) u′T > 0 and uT (0) = u
′
T (L) = 0
and thatm0 is a probability measure with support away from 0, i.e.
(H2) m0 ∈ P(Q¯), and supp(m0) ⊂ (0,L].
We shall say that a pair (u,m) is a solution to (1.6), if
(i) u ∈ C1,2(QT ), u,ux ∈ C(QT );
(ii) m ∈ C([0, T ];M(Q¯)) ∩ L1(QT )+, and ‖m(t)‖L1 6 1 for every t ∈ (0, T ];
(iii) the equation for u holds in the classical sense, while the equation for m holds in
the weak sense (1.2c).
The following lemma establishes the connection between (u,m) and problem (1.5):
Lemma 1.4. Let (u,m) be a solution to (1.6) and set ρ∗t := qu,m(t,X
ρ∗
t ). Then
(1.8) max
ρ>0
Jc(ρ) = Jc(ρ
∗) =
∫L
0
u(0, .)dm0.
The proof of Lemma 1.4 is standard, and is given in Appendix A. We deduce that
the MFG system (1.6) describes an equilibrium configuration for a Cournot game with
exhaustible resources and a continuum of producers.
We are now in a position to state the main results of this paper.
Theorem 1.5 (Well-posedness). There exists a unique solution (u,m) to system (1.6).
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Theorem 1.6 (Existence of ε-Nash equilibria). Let (u,m) be the solution to the MFG system
(1.6), and let qu,m be given by (1.7). For anyN > 1 and i ∈ {1, ...,N} let
(1.9)
{
dXˆit = −qu,m(t, Xˆ
i
t)dt + σdW
i
t − dξ
Xˆi
t
Xi0 = Vi,
and set qˆit := qu,m(t, Xˆ
i
t). Then for any ε > 0, the strategy profile (qˆ
1, ..., qˆN) is admissible, i.e.
belongs to
∏N
i=1 Ac, and provides an ε-Nash equilibrium to the game J
1,N
c , ..., J
N,N
c for large N.
Namely: ∀ε > 0, ∃Nε > 1 such that
(1.10) ∀N > Nε,∀i = 1, ...,N, J
i,N
c
(
qi; (qˆj)j 6=i
)
6 ε+ Ji,Nc
(
qˆ1, ..., qˆN
)
,
for any admissible strategy qi ∈ Ac.
The proof of Theorem 1.5 is given in Section 2, while Section 3 is devoted to the proof
of Theorem 1.6.
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2. ANALYSIS OF THE MFG SYSTEM
This section is devoted to the analysis of (1.6). We begin by establishing some pre-
liminary estimates having to do with (i) the existence and regularity of qu,m defined in
(1.7), and (ii) some regularity properties of weak solutions to the Fokker-Planck equation.
Then we prove some a priori bounds on solutions of the system (1.6), which gives way to
our proof of Theorem 1.5 by means of classical fixed point theory.
2.1. Preliminary estimates. We start by giving an alternative convenient expression for
the production rate function qu,m. We aim to write qu,m as a functional of ux,m and the
market price function pu,m, that is defined by [13]:
(2.1) pu,m(t, x) := 1− (qu,m(t, x) + κq¯(t)).
The latter expression means that the price pu,m(t, x) received by an atomic player with
reserves x at time t, is a linear and nonincreasing function, of the player’s production
rate qu,m(t, x), and the aggregate production rate across all producers q¯(t). For any
µ ∈M(Q¯), we define
(2.2) a(µ) :=
1
1+ κη(µ)
; c(µ) := 1− a(µ); η(µ) :=
∫L
0
d|µ|
and set
(2.3a) p(t) :=
1
η(m(t))
∫L
0
pu,m(t, x)m(t, x)dx.
By integrating (2.1) with respect tom and after a little algebra one recovers the following
identity
a (m(t)) + c (m(t)) p(t) = 1− κq¯(t),
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which entails
(2.3b) pu,m(t, x) = a (m(t)) + c (m(t))p(t) − qu,m(t, x),
and
(2.3c) qu,m(t, x) =
1
2
{a (m(t)) + c (m(t))p(t) − ux(t, x)}
+
.
This duality is also known as Bertrand and Cournot equivalence, and expresses the fact
that the problem of controlling the rate of production by anticipating global production,
is equivalent to the problem of controlling the selling price by anticipating the average
price in the market and the rate of active producers. We omit the details and refer to
[13, Section B.2]. For convenience, we shall often use (2.3c) as a definition for qu,m.
In contrast to the systems studied in [13, 20, 21], pu,m has no explicit formula and is
only defined as a fixed point through (2.3a)-(2.3c). The following Lemma makes that
statement clear and point out a few facts on the market price function.
Lemma 2.1. Let u ∈ L∞ (0, T ;C1(Q¯)), m ∈ L1(QT )+, and κ > 0. Then the market price
function pu,m is well-defined through (2.3a)-(2.3c), belongs to L
∞(0, T ;C(Q¯)), and satisfies
(2.4) − ‖ux‖∞ 6 pu,m 6 1.
Moreover, if ux is non-negative, then pu,m is non-negative as well.
Proof. Let f : R2 → R be given by f(x,y) = x− 1
2
(x− y)+. Note that f is 1-Lipschitz in the
first variable, and 1
2
-Lipschitz in the second. For any p,w ∈ X := L∞(0, T ;C(Q¯)), define
ℓ(m,p)(t) := a (m(t)) + c (m(t))p(t), where p(t) :=
1
η(m(t))
∫L
0
p(t, x)m(t, x)dx,
and
Λ(w,m,p)(t, x) := f(ℓ(m,p)(t),w(t, x)).
We note the following inequalities for future reference:∣∣ℓ(m,p)(t) − ℓ(m,p ′)(t)∣∣ 6 κ
1+ κ
∥∥p(t, ·) − p ′(t, ·)∥∥∞ ,(2.5a) ∥∥Λ(w,m,p)(t, ·) −Λ(w,m,p ′)(t, ·)∥∥∞ 6 κ1+ κ
∥∥p(t, ·) − p ′(t, ·)∥∥∞ ,(2.5b) ∣∣Λ(w,m,p)(t, x) −Λ(w ′,m,p)(t, x)∣∣ 6 1
2
∣∣w(t, x) −w ′(t, x)∣∣ ,(2.5c) ∣∣Λ(w,m,p)(t, x) −Λ(w,m ′,p)(t, x)∣∣ 6 ∣∣ℓ(m,p)(t) − ℓ(m ′,p)(t)∣∣ .(2.5d)
We aim to use Banach fixed point Theorem to show that
(2.6) p = a(m) + c(m)p¯ −
1
2
{a(m) + c(m)p¯ − ux}
+
has a unique solution pu,m ∈ X, which satisfies (2.4). For any p ∈ X, let us set
ψ(p) := Λ(ux,m,p) = a(m) + c(m)p¯ −
1
2
{a(m) + c(m)p¯ − ux}
+
.
Observe that ψ(X) ⊂ X, and p 6 1 entails ψ(p) 6 1. Moreover, if we suppose that
p > −‖ux‖∞, then it holds that
ψ(p) > −c(m)‖ux‖∞,
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so that ψ(p) > −‖ux‖∞, since c(m) < 1. On the other hand, by appealing to (2.5b) we
have
‖ψ(p1) −ψ(p2)‖X 6
κ
1+ κ
‖p1 − p2‖X ∀p1,p2 ∈ X.
Therefore by invoking Banach fixed point Theorem, and the estimates above we deduce
the existence of a unique solution pu,m ∈ X to problem (2.6) satisfying (2.4).
When ux is non-negative, note that p > 0 entails ψ(p) > 0, so that the same fixed point
argument yields pu,m > 0. 
Next, we collect some facts related to the Fokker-Planck equation (1.2a)-(1.2b).
Lemma 2.2 (regularity of η). Letm be a weak solution to (1.2a)-(1.2b), starting from somem0
satisfying (H2). Suppose that b is bounded, and satisfies (1.1b). Then the map t → η(t) :=
η(m(t)) is continuous on [0, T ].
Moreover, if in addition m0 belongs to L
1(Q), then we have:
(i) the function t → η(t) is locally Ho¨lder continuous on (0, T ]; namely, there exists γ > 0
such that
(2.7a) |η(t1) − η(t2)| 6 C(t0, ‖b‖∞) |t1 − t2|γ ∀t1, t2 ∈ [t0, T ]
for all t0 ∈ (0, T);
(ii) for any α > 0 and φ ∈ Cα(Q¯), there exists β > 0 such that
(2.7b)
∣∣∣∣∣
∫L
0
φ(x) (m(t1, x) −m(t2, x)) dx
∣∣∣∣∣ 6 C(t0, ‖b‖∞, ‖φ‖Cα)|t1−t2|β ∀t1, t2 ∈ [t0, T ]
for all t0 ∈ (0, T).
Remark 2.3. This lemma shows that t 7→ m(t) is locally Ho¨lder continuous in time in
(0, T ] with respect to the (Cα)∗ topology; this is useful later to get equicontinuity for
construction of a fixed point (cf. Section 2.3). Our method of proof does not allow us
to show Ho¨lder continuity on all of [0, T ], because it is based on heat kernel estimates,
which degenerate as t→ 0 (cf. Equation (2.16)). However, we find it difficult to construct
a counterexample.
Proof. The proof requires several steps and lies on the probabilistic interpretation of m
which we recall briefly here, and use in other parts of this paper.
Step 1 (probabilistic interpretation): Consider the reflected diffusion process governed by
(2.8a) dXt = −b(t,Xt)dt+ σdWt − dξ
X
t , X0 ∼ m0,
where X0 is F0-measurable, (Wt)t∈[0,T ] is a F-Wiener process that is independent of X0,
and set
(2.8b) τ := inf{t > 0 : Xt 6 0} ∧ T .
By virtue of the regularity assumptions on b, equation (2.8a) is well-posed in the classical
sense. Furthermore, since the process (ξXt )t>0 is monotone, (Xt)t∈[0,T ] is a continuous
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semimartingale. Hence, by means of Itoˆ’s rule and the optional stopping theorem, we
have for any test function φ ∈ C∞c ([0, T) ×Q) satisfying (1.2d):
E [φ(0,X0)] = E
[∫τ
0
(
−φt(v,Xv) −
σ2
2
φxx(v,Xv) + φx(v,Xv)b(v,Xv)
)
dv
]
,
and thus the law of Xt is a weak solution to the Fokker-Planck equation. The function b
being bounded, one sees that
E
[∫T
0
b(s,Xs)
2 ds
]
<∞.
Therefore, by virtue of the uniqueness for (1.2a)-(1.2b) (cf. Proposition B.1), we obtain:
(2.8c)
∫
A
m(t, x)dx = P(t < τ;Xt ∈ A)
for every Borel set A ∈ Q¯ and for a.e. t ∈ (0, T).
Step 2: Now, let us show that t → P(t < τ) is right continuous on [0, T ]. In fact, we
have for any ǫ > 0 and t ∈ [0, T ]
P(t < τ) − P(t+ h < τ) = P(t+ h > τ; t < τ)(2.9a)
6 P(t+ h > τ;Xt > ǫ) + P(t < τ;Xt < ǫ).
On the one hand, for every t ∈ [0, T ]
(2.9b) lim
ǫ→0+
P(t < τ;Xt < ǫ) 6 lim
ǫ→0+
P (0 < Xt < ǫ) = 0,
thanks to the bounded convergence theorem. On the other hand
P(t+ h > τ;Xt > ǫ) 6 P
(
inf
v∈[t,t+h]
Xv − Xt 6 −ǫ
)
6 P
(
inf
v∈[0,h]
σ(Wt+v −Wt) + (ξ
X
t − ξ
X
t+h) 6 −ǫ+ h‖b‖∞
)
,
where we have used the fact that the local time is nondecreasing and b is bounded. Fur-
thermore, by using (1.1e), it holds that
ξXt − ξ
X
t+h > inf
v∈[0,h]
(Yt − Yt+v) > σ inf
v∈[0,h]
(Wt −Wt+v) − h‖b‖∞.
Therefore
P(t+ h > τ;Xt > ǫ) 6 P
(
sup
v∈[0,h]
Bv − inf
v∈[0,h]
Bv >
ǫ− 2h‖b‖∞
σ
)
,
where (Bt)t>0 is a Wiener process.
Now, choose ǫ = ǫ(h) := h1/2 log(1/h). We have ǫ(h) → 0 as h → 0+, and by using
Markov’s inequality and the distribution of the maximum of Brownian motion we get:
(2.9c) P(t+ h > τ;Xt > ǫ) 6
2σ
ǫ(h) − 2h‖b‖∞E |Bh| 6
2σ
log(1/h) − 2‖b‖∞h1/2 .
Thus 0 6 P(t < τ) − P(t+ h < τ)→ 0 as h→ 0+.
14 P. JAMESON GRABER AND CHARAFEDDINE MOUZOUNI
Step 3 (Ho¨lder estimates): Now, we prove (2.7a)-(2.7b). At first, note that (2.8c) entails
(2.10)
∫L
0
φ(x)m(t, x)dx = E [φ(Xt)1t<τ]
for a.e. t ∈ (0, T) and for any φ ∈ C(Q¯). Actually (2.10) holds for every t ∈ [0, T ], since the
RHS and LHS of (2.10) are both right continuous on [0, T ], andm0 is supported on (0,L].
Indeed, on the one hand t→
∫L
0
φ(x)m(t, x)dx is continuous on [0, T ] for any continuous
function φ on Q¯, sincem ∈ C([0, T ];L1(Q)) (cf. [35, Theorem 3.6]). On the other hand, for
any φ ∈ C(Q¯)
(2.11) E |φ(Xt+h)1t+h<τ − φ(Xt)1t<τ|
6 ‖φ‖∞(P(t < τ) − P(t+ h < τ)) + E |φ(Xt+h) − φ(Xt)| ,
so that
lim
h→0+
E |φ(Xt+h)1t+h<τ − φǫ(Xt)1t<τ| = 0
thanks to (2.9a)-(2.9c), and the bounded convergence theorem.
Now, let us fix ǫ > 0 and define φǫ = φǫ(x) to be a smooth cut-off function on [0,L],
which satisfies the following conditions:
(2.12) 0 6 φǫ 6 1; 0 6 φ
′
ǫ 6 2/ǫ; φǫ1[0,ǫ] = 0; φǫ1[2ǫ,L] = 1.
As a first step, we aim to derive an estimation of the concentration of mass at the origine.
Namely, we want to show that for an arbitrary k > 1,
(2.13)
∫L
0
(1− φǫ(x))m(t, x)dx 6 C(k, ‖b‖∞)
(
1− e−π
2t/4L2
)−1/2k
ǫ1/2k ∀t ∈ (0, T ].
Given (2.10), this is equivalent to showing that
(2.14) E [(1− φǫ(Xt))1t<τ] 6 C(k, ‖b‖∞)
(
1− e−π
2t/4L2
)−1/2k
ǫ1/2k ∀t ∈ (0, T ]
holds for any k > 1. Apply Girsanov’s Theorem with the following change of measure:
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣
Ft
= exp
{
−σ−1
∫ t
0
b(s,Xs)dWs −
σ−2
2
∫t
0
b(s,Xs)
2 ds
}
=: Ψt.
UnderQ, the process (Xt)t∈[0,T ] is a reflected Brownianmotion at L, with initial condition
X0, thanks to (1.1c). Moreover, by virtue of Ho¨lder inequality, we have for every k > 1:
EP [(1− φǫ(Xt))1t<τ]
= EQ
[
Ψ−1t (1− φǫ(Xt))1t<τ
]
6 EQ[Ψ
−k ′
t ]
1/k ′EQ
[
(1− φǫ(Xt))
k
1t<τ
]1/k
6 EP[Ψ
1−k ′
t ]
1/k ′EQ
[
(1− φǫ(Xt))
k
1t<τ
]1/k
6 EP
[
exp
{
C(k,σ)
∫ t
0
b(s,Xs)
2 ds
}]1/2k ′
EQ
[
(1− φǫ(Xt))
k
1t<τ
]1/k
.
Indeed, one checks that
EP[Ψ
1−k ′
t ]
1/k ′
6 EP [Zt]
1/2k ′
EP
[
exp
{
2
(
1− k ′
σ
)2 ∫t
0
b(s,Xs)
2 ds
}]1/2k ′
,
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where (Zt)t>0 is a super-martingale. Hence, using the fact that b is bounded, we obtain
(2.15) EP [(1− φǫ(Xt))1t<τ] 6 C(k, ‖b‖∞)EQ [(1− φǫ(Xt))k1t<τ]1/k .
Now
EQ
[
(1− φǫ(Xt))
k
1t<τ
]
=
∫L
0
(1− φǫ(x))
kw(t, x)dx,
where w solves
wt =
1
2
wxx, w(t, 0) = 0, wx(t,L) = 0,w|t=0 = m0.
We can compute w via Fourier series, namely
w(t, x) =
∑
n>1
Ane
−λ2nt/2 sin(λnx), An :=
2
L
∫L
0
sin(λny)dm0(y), λn :=
(2n − 1)π
2L
.
Note that ∫L
0
(1− φǫ(x))
kw(t, x)dx 6 (2ǫ)1/2‖w(t, ·)‖L2
6 ǫ1/2

∑
n>1
L|An|
2e−λ
2
nt


1/2
(Parseval)
6 ǫ1/2
(
4
L(1− e−π
2t/4L2)
)1/2
.
So (2.15) now yields
(2.16) EP [(1−φǫ(Xt))1t<τ] 6 C(k, ‖b‖∞)
(
4
L(1− e−π
2t/4L2)
)1/2k
ǫ1/2k
which is (2.14). This in turn implies (2.13).
Furthermore, note that for any 1 < s < 3/2,
(2.17) ‖m(t1) −m(t2)‖W−1s 6 C
(
‖m0‖L1 , ‖m|b|
2‖L1
)
|t1 − t2|
1−1/s ∀t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ],
where W−1s (Q) is the dual space of W
1,s ′
0 (Q) :=
{
v ∈W1s ′(Q) : v(0) = 0
}
. This claim
follows from [35, Proposition 3.10(iii)], where we obtain the estimate
(2.18) ‖m‖L∞(0,T ;L1(Q)) + ‖∇m‖Ls(QT ) + ‖m‖Lv(QT ) + ‖mt‖Ls(0,T ;W−1s (Q))
6 C
(
‖m0‖L1 , ‖m|b|
2‖L1
)
for any s up to 3/2 and v up to 3. In particular, (2.17) follows from the estimate on
‖mt‖Ls(0,T ;W−1s (Q)). Now, fix 0 < t1 6 t2 6 T , and let φǫ be the cut-off function that is
defined in (2.12). Based on the specifications of (2.12), observe that
‖φǫ‖W1
s ′
6 Cǫ−1/s.
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Since φǫ satisfies Neumann boundary conditions at x = L and Dirichlet at x = 0, it is a
valid test function and we can appeal to the estimates above to obtain for any k > 1,
(2.19) |η(t1) − η(t2)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
∫L
0
{(1− φǫ(x)) + φǫ(x)} (m(t1, x) −m(t2, x))dx
∣∣∣∣∣
6
∫L
0
|1− φǫ(x)||m(t1, x) −m(t2, x)|dx+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫L
0
φǫ(x)(m(t1, x) −m(t2, x))dx
∣∣∣∣∣
6
∫L
0
(1− φǫ(x))(m(t1, x) +m(t2, x))dx +
∣∣∣∣∣
∫L
0
φǫ(x)(m(t1, x) −m(t2, x))dx
∣∣∣∣∣
6 C(k, ‖b‖∞)
(
1− e−π
2 t1/4L
2
)−1/2k
ǫ1/2k + ‖φǫ‖W1
s ′
‖m(t1) −m(t2)‖W−1s
6 C(k, ‖b‖∞)
(
1− e−π
2t1/4L
2
)−1/2k
ǫ1/2k + Cǫ−1/s|t1 − t2|
1−1/s,
where we have used (2.13) in the penultimate line and (2.17) in the ultimate line. Given
0 < γ < (s − 1)/(s + 2), we take ǫ = |t1 − t2|
s(1−γ)−1 and then set k =
s(1−γ)−1
2γ > 1 to
obtain (2.7a).
Finally, let φ ∈ Cα(Q¯) for some α > 0, an let t0 ∈ (0, T). In view of (2.10), we have for
every t1, t2 ∈ [t0, T ],∣∣∣∣∣
∫L
0
φ(x)(m(t1, x) −m(t2, x))dx
∣∣∣∣∣ 6 E |φ(Xt1)1t1<τ − φ(Xt2)1t2<τ|
6 ‖φ‖Cα (|η(t1) − η(t2)| + E |Xt1 − Xt2 |
α) .
Hence, by using (2.7a) and the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality [37, Thm IV.42.1], we
deduce the desired result:∣∣∣∣∣
∫L
0
φ(x)(m(t1, x) −m(t2, x))dx
∣∣∣∣∣ 6 C(t0, ‖b‖∞)‖φ‖Cα |t1 − t2|β ,
for some β > 0.
Step 4 (general data): Now, we suppose thatm0 is a probability measure satisfying (H2),
and not necessarily an element of L1(Q). Let us choose a sequence (mn0 ) ⊂ L
1(Q)+, which
converges weakly (in the sense of measures) tom0, such that
(2.20) ‖mn0 ‖L1 6
∫L
0
dm0 6 1,
and let mn to be the weak solution to (1.2a)-(1.2b) starting from mn0 . The function b
being bounded, we can use [35, Proposition 3.10] to extract a subsequence of (mn), which
converges tom in L1(QT ). Owing to (2.7a), the sequence η
n := η(mn) is equicontinuous.
Hence, one can extract further a subsequence to deduce that η is continuous on (0, T ].
Combining this conclusion with the fact that t → P(t < τ) is right continuous on [0, T ]
and (2.8c), we deduce in particular that
(2.21) η(t) = P(t < τ), ∀t ∈ (0, T ].
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Now, since m0 is supported on (0,L] one has η(m0) = η(0) = P(0 < τ) = 1, which in
turn entails that η is continuous on [0, T ] thanks to (2.9a)-(2.9c) and (2.21). The proof is
complete. 
Remark 2.4. When m0 satisfies (H2) and does not necessarily belong to L
1(Q), the prob-
abilistic characterisation (2.10) still holds for every t ∈ [0, T ]. In fact, using the same
approximation techniques as in Lemma 2.2- Step 4, and appealing to (2.7b) and (2.8c), it
holds that ∫L
0
φ(x)m(t, x)dx = E [φ(Xt)1t<τ]
for every t ∈ [0, T ], α > 0 and φ ∈ Cα(Q¯). Thus, (2.10) ensues by using density argu-
ments.
2.2. A priori estimates. Now, we collect several a priori estimates for system (1.6).
Lemma 2.5. Suppose that (u,m) satisfies the system (1.6) such that m ∈ L1(QT )+, and u
belongs toW1,2s (QT ) for large enough s > 1. Then, we have:
(i) the maps u and ux are non-negative; in particular
(2.22) 0 6 qu,m 6 1/2;
(ii) there exists θ > 0 and a constant c0 > 0 such that
(2.23) ‖u‖Cθ(QT ), ‖ux‖Cθ(QT ) 6 c0
where c0 depends only on T and data. In addition, we have
‖uxx‖Cθ(Q ′),6 c1(Q
′,θ) ∀Q ′ ⊂⊂ (0, T) × (0,L];
If in addition m0 belongs to L
1(Q), then there exists a Ho¨lder exponent θ > 0 such that
‖pu,m‖Cθ([t0,T ]×[0,L]) 6 c2(t0,θ), ∀t0 ∈ (0, T),
and
‖ut‖Cθ(Q ′) 6 c2(Q
′,θ) ∀Q ′ ⊂⊂ (0, T) × (0,L].
Proof. For large enough s > 1, we know that u,ux ∈ C(QT ) thanks to Sobolev-Ho¨lder
embeddings. In view of
−ut −
σ2
2
uxx + ru > 0,
one easily deduces that u > e−rT minx uT , which entails in particular that u > 0 thanks
to (H1). Thus, the minimum is attained at u(t, 0) = 0, so that ux(t, 0) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Differentiating the first equation in (1.6) we have that ux is a generalised solution (cf.
[26, Chapter III]) of the following parabolic equation:
uxt +
σ2
2
uxxx − rux − qu,muxx = 0.
By virtue of the maximum principle [26, Theorem III.7.1] we infer that ux > 0, since
ux(t, 0), ux(t,L) and u
′
T are all non-negative functions. Therefore (2.22) follows straight-
forwardly from (2.3c) thanks to Lemma 2.1.
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Note that u solves a parabolic equation with bounded coefficients. Since compatibility
conditions of order zero are fulfilled thanks to (H1), then from [26, Theorem IV.9.1] we
have an estimate on u inW1,2k (QT ) for arbitrary k > 1, namely
(2.24)
‖u‖
W
1,2
k (QT )
6 C
(
‖qu,m‖Lk(QT ) + ‖uT ‖
W
2− 2
k
k (QT )
)
6 C
(
‖qu,m‖L∞(QT ) + ‖uT ‖
W
2− 2
k
k (QT )
)
.
This estimate depends only on T , k and data, thanks to (2.22). We deduce (2.23) thanks to
Sobolev-Ho¨lder embeddings.
Now, let φ ∈ C∞c ((0, T) × (0,+∞)). Observe that w = φux satisfies
wt +
σ2
2
wxx − rw − qu,mwx = φtux + σ
2φxuxx +
σ2
2
φxxux − qu,mφxux.
For any k > 1, the right-hand side is bounded in Lk(QT ) with a constant that depends
only on φ, and previous estimates. Since w has homogeneous boundary conditions, we
deduce from [26, Theorem IV.9.1] that ‖wx‖Cθ(QT ) is bounded by a constant depending
only on the norm of φ and previous estimates. The local Ho¨lder estimate on uxx then
follows.
Let p(t, x) = pu,m(t, x). Recall that p(t, x) = f(ℓ(m,p)(t),ux(t, x)) where f(x,y) :=
x − 1
2
(x − y)+ (cf. Lemma 2.1). Since f is 1-Lipschitz in the first variable and 1
2
-Lipschitz
in the second, we deduce that
(2.25) |p(t1, x1) − p(t2, x2)| 6 |ℓ(m,p)(t1) − ℓ(m,p)(t2)| +
1
2
|ux(t1, x1) − ux(t2, x2)|.
In particular, for each t,
(2.26) |p(t, x1) − p(t, x2)| 6
1
2
|ux(t, x1) − ux(t, x2)|
which, by (2.23), implies that p(t, ·) is Ho¨lder continuous for every t.
Now, we further assume that m0 ∈ L
1(Q)+ to use (2.7a)-(2.7b). We shall use the fol-
lowing function which is introduced in Lemma 2.1:
ℓ(m,p)(t) = a (m(t)) + c (m(t))p(t), where p(t) =
1
η(m(t))
∫L
0
p(t, x)m(t, x)dx.
Fix t0 ∈ (0, T) and for t1, t2 in [t0, T ]write
(2.27) ℓ(m,p)(t1) − ℓ(m,p)(t2) = a(m(t1)) − a(m(t2))
+ κ(a(m(t1)) − a(m(t2)))
∫L
0
p(t1, .)dm(t1)
+ κa(m(t2))
∫L
0
p(t1, .)d(m(t1) −m(t2))
+ κa(m(t2))
∫L
0
(p(t1, .) − p(t2, .))dm(t2),
where we have used the fact that c(m) = κa(m)η(m). Observe that η → 1
1+κη
is κ-
Lipschitz in the η variable, and recall that p(t1, ·) is Ho¨lder continuous. Moreover, by
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virtue of (2.23) we know that qu,m satisfies (1.1b). Therefore, using the upper bound on
a(m), c(m) and (2.7a)-(2.7b) we infer that
(2.28) |ℓ(m,p)(t1) − ℓ(m,p)(t2)| 6 C|t1 − t2|
β +
κ
1+ κ
‖p(t1, ·) − p(t2, ·)‖∞.
Note that the constant in (2.28) depend only on c0 and κ thanks to (2.22), (2.23) and
Lemma 2.1. Using now (2.28) in (2.25), and choosing θ small enough, we deduce
(2.29)
1
1+ κ
‖p(t1, ·) − p(t2, ·)‖∞ 6 C|t1 − t2|β + 1
2
‖ux(t1, ·) − ux(t2, ·)‖∞ 6 C|t1 − t2|θ.
Putting together (2.26) and (2.29) we infer that p has a Ho¨lder estimate, whereupon by
(2.28) so does ℓ(m,p). Thus qu,m also has a Ho¨lder estimate, and so does ut by the HJB
equation satisfied by u. 
2.3. Well-posedness. We are now in position to prove the main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 1.5. The proof requires several steps, the key arguments being precisely
the estimates collected in Lemmas 2.1-2.5.
Step 1 (data in L1): We suppose that m0 is an element of L
1(Q) satisfying (H2). Define
X to be the space of couples (ϕ,ν), such that ϕ and ϕx are globally continuous on QT ,
and ν belongs to L1(QT )+. The functional space X endowed with the norm:
‖(ϕ,ν)‖X := ‖ϕ‖∞ + ‖ϕx‖∞ + ‖ν‖L1
is a Banach space. Consider the map T : (ϕ,ν, λ) ∈ X × [0, 1] → (w,µ) where (w,µ) are
given by the following parametrized system of coupled partial differential equations:
(2.30)


(i) wt +
σ2
2
wxx − rw+ λ
2q2ϕ,ν = 0 in QT ,
(ii) µt −
σ2
2
µxx − {λqϕ,νµ}x = 0 in QT ,
(iii) µ(t, 0) = 0, w(t, 0) = 0, wx(t,L) = 0 in [0, T ],
(iv) µ(0) = λm0, w(T , x) = λuT (x) in [0,L],
(v)
σ2
2
µx + λqϕ,νµ = 0 in [0, T ]× {L}.
By virtue of Lemma 2.1, the map qϕ,ν is well-defined for any (ϕ,ν) ∈ X, and satisfies
(2.31) |qϕ,ν| 6 C(1+ ‖ϕx‖∞).
In view of [26, Theorem IV.9.1], the function w exists and is bounded in W1,2s (QT ) for
any s > 1, by a constant which depends on ‖ϕx‖∞ and data. (Note that the required
compatibility conditions hold owing to (H1). Although [26, Theorem IV.9.1] is stated
for Dirichlet boundary conditions, its proof is readily adapted to Neumann or mixed
boundary conditions as in the present context; cf. the discussion in the first paragraph of
[26, Section IV.9]). We deduce that
‖w‖Cα + ‖wx‖Cα 6 C(T ,L,uT , ‖ϕx‖∞)
for some α > 0. On the other hand, it is well known (see e.g. [26, Chapter III]) that for any
(ϕ,ν) ∈ X, equation (2.30)(ii) has a unique weak solution µ. Therefore, T is well-defined.
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Let us now prove that T is continuous and compact. Suppose (ϕn,νn, λn) is a a bounded
sequence in X× [0, 1] and let (wn,µn) = T(ϕn,νn, λn). To prove compactness, we show
that, up to a subsequence, (wn,µn) converges to some (w,µ) in X. Since (ϕn)x is uni-
formly bounded, by virtue of [35, Proposition 3.10], the sequence µn is relatively compact
in L1(QT )+, thanks to (2.31) (cf. (2.32) below where more details are given). Since wn
and (wn)x are uniformly bounded in C
α(QT ), by the Ascoli-Arzela` Theorem and uni-
form convergence of the derivative there exists some w such that w,wx are continuous
inQT and, passing to a subsequence,wn → w and (wn)x → wx uniformly, where in fact
wn ⇀ w weakly inW
1,2
s (QT ) for any s > 1. This is what we wanted to show.
To prove continuity, we assume (ϕn,νn, λn) → (ϕ,ν, λ) in X × [0, 1]. It is enough to
show that, after passing to a subsequence, T(ϕn,νn, λn)→ T(ϕ,ν, λ). By the preceding
argument, we can assume T(ϕn,νn, λn) → (w,µ). We can also use estimates (2.5b)-
(2.5d) to deduce that qϕn,νn → qϕ,ν a.e. (cf. the proof of Equation (2.35) below), and
since qϕn,νn is uniformly bounded we can also assert qϕn,νn → qϕ,ν in L
s for any
s > 1. Then we deduce that (w,µ) is a solution of (2.30) for the given (ϕ,ν, λ). Therefore,
(w,µ) = T(ϕ,ν, λ), as desired.
Now, let (u,m) ∈ X and λ ∈ [0, 1] so that (u,m) = T(u,m, λ). Then (u,m) satisfies
assumptions of Lemma 2.5 with m0,uT ,qu,m replaced by λm0, λuT and λqu,m, respec-
tively. Since the bounds of Lemma 2.5 carry through uniformly in λ ∈ [0, 1] we infer
that
‖(u,m)‖X 6 1∨ c0,
where c0 > 0 is the constant of Lemma 2.5. In addition, for λ = 0 we have T(u,m, 0) =
(0, 0). Therefore, by virtue of Leray-Schauder fixed point Theorem (see e.g. [17, Theorem
11.6]), we deduce the existence of a solution (u,m) in X to system (1.6).
Step 2 (measure data): We deal now with general m0, i.e. a probability measure that is
supported on (0,L]. Let (mn0 ) ⊂ L
1(Q)+ be a sequence of functions, which converges
weakly (in the sense of measures) tom0, and such that
‖mn0 ‖L1 6
∫L
0
dm0 6 1, and supp(m
n
0 ) ⊂ (0,L].
For any n > 1, define (un,mn) to be a solution in X to system (1.6) starting frommn0 .
In view of [35, Proposition 3.10 (iii)] and (2.22), the corresponding solutionsmn to the
non-local Fokker-Planck equation lie in a relatively compact set of L1(QT ). Moreover, it
holds that
(2.32) mn > 0 and sup
06t6T
‖mn(t)‖L1 6
∫L
0
dm0.
Passing to a subsequence we havemn → m in L1(QT ),m
n(t) → m(t) in L1(Q) for a.e. t
in (0, T), andmn → m for a.e. (t, x) in QT . It follows thatm ∈ L
1(QT )+ and
(2.33) ‖m(t)‖L1 6 1 for a.e. t ∈ (0, T).
In addition, we know that qu,m fulfils the assumptions of Lemma 2.2. Thus t→ ‖m(t)‖L1
is continuous on (0, T ], so that (2.33) holds for avery t ∈ (0, T ]. Furthermore, we can
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appeal to the probabilistic characterisation (2.10), thanks to Remark 2.4, to get∣∣∣∣∣
∫L
0
φ(x)(m(t + h, x) −m(t))dx
∣∣∣∣∣ 6 E |φ(Xt+h)1t+h<τ − φ(Xt)1t<τ|
6 ‖φ‖∞|η(t) − η(t + h)| + E |φ(Xt+h) − φ(Xt)|
for every φ ∈ C(Q¯), and t ∈ [0, T ]. Now owing to Lemma 2.2, η is continuous on [0, T ].
Hence, by taking the limit in the last estimation we infer that
lim
h→0
∫L
0
φ(x)(m(t + h, x) −m(t))dx = 0
thanks to the bounded convergence theorem. Consequently the map t→ m(t) is contin-
uous on [0, T ] with respect to the strong topology ofM(Q¯).
On the other hand, by Lemma 2.5 we have that un, unx are uniformly bounded in
Cθ(QT ), and u
n
t , u
n
xx are uniformly bounded in C
θ(Q ′) for each Q ′ ⊂⊂ (0, T) × (0,L].
Thus, up to a subsequence we obtain that u,ux ∈ C(QT ), and
(2.34) un → u ∈ C1,2((0, T) × (0,L])
where the convergence is in the C1,2 norm on arbitrary compact subsets of (0, T) × (0,L].
To show that the Hamilton-Jacobi equation holds in a classical sense and the Fokker-
Planck equation holds in the sense of distributions, it remains to show that
(2.35) qun,mn → qu,m a.e.
at least on a subsequence. Set pn = pun,mn = Λ(u
n
x ,m
n,pn) and p = pu,m = Λ(ux,m,p),
with Λ defined in Lemma 2.1. Using (2.5b)-(2.5d) we get
(2.36) ‖pn(t, ·) − p(t, ·)‖∞ 6 ‖Λ(unx ,mn,pn)(t, ·) −Λ(ux,mn,pn)(t, ·)‖∞
+ ‖Λ(ux,m
n,pn)(t, ·) −Λ(ux,m
n,p)(t, ·)‖∞ + ‖Λ(ux,mn,p)(t, ·) −Λ(ux,m,p)(t, ·)‖∞
6
1
2
‖unx − ux‖∞ + κ1+ κ‖pn(t, ·) − p(t, ·)‖∞ + |ℓ(mn,p)(t) − ℓ(m,p)(t)|
which means
(2.37) ‖pn(t, ·) − p(t, ·)‖∞ 6 1+ κ
2
‖unx − ux‖∞ + (1+ κ)|ℓ(mn,p)(t) − ℓ(m,p)(t)|.
Noting that (up to a subsequence) mn(t) → m(t) in L1(Q) a.e., we use the fact that
a(m), c(m),η(m) are all continuous with respect to this metric to deduce that
(2.38) |ℓ(mn,p)(t) − ℓ(m,p)(t)| → 0 a.e. t ∈ (0, T)
from which we conclude that
(2.39) ‖pn(t, ·) − p(t, ·)‖∞ → 0 a.e. t ∈ (0, T).
Now from (2.39) and (2.5a) we have
(2.40) |ℓ(m,pn)(t) − ℓ(m,p)(t)|→ 0 a.e. t ∈ (0, T).
Combining (2.38) and (2.40) we see that ℓ(mn,pn) → ℓ(m,p) a.e. We deduce (2.35) from
the definition (2.3c). Therefore (un,mn) converges to some (u,m) which is a solution to
(1.6) with initial datam0.
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Step 3 (uniqueness): Let (ui,mi), i = 1, 2 be two solutions of (1.6). We set
Gi := qui,mi and G¯i :=
∫L
0
qui,mi(t,y)dmi(t).
From (1.7), we know that
(2.41) Gi =
1
2
(
1− κG¯i − ui,x
)+
.
Let u = u1 − u2,m = m1 −m2,G = G1 −G2, G¯ = G¯1 − G¯2. Using (t, x)→ e
−rtu(t, x)
as a test function in the equations satisfied bym1,m2, with some algebra yields
(2.42) 0 =
∫T
0
e−rt
∫L
0
(G22 −G
2
1 −G1ux)m1 + (G
2
1 −G
2
2 +G2ux)m2 dx dt
=
∫T
0
e−rt
∫L
0
(G1 −G2)
2(m1 +m2)dx dt+
∫T
0
e−rt
∫L
0
(2G+ ux)(G2m2 −G1m1)dx dt.
Now since G2 = 0 on the set where 1− κG¯2(t) − u2,x < 0, we can write
(2G + ux)G2 =
((
1− κG¯1 − u1,x
)+
−
(
1− κG¯2(t) − u2,x
)
+ u1,x − u2,x
)
G2
=
(
−κG¯+
(
1− κG¯1 − u1,x
)−)
G2.
Similarly we can write
(2G + ux)G1 =
((
1− κG¯1 − u1,x
)
−
(
1− κG¯2(t) − u2,x
)+
+ u1,x − u2,x
)
G1
=
(
−κG¯−
(
1− κG¯2 − u2,x
)−)
G1.
Thus we compute
∫L
0
(2G+ ux)(G2m2 −G1m1)dx dt = κG¯
2 +
∫L
0
(
1− κG¯1 − u1,x
)−
G2m2 dx dt
+
∫L
0
(
1− κG¯2 − u2,x
)−
G1m1 dx dt > κG¯
2.
So from (2.42) we conclude
(2.43)
∫T
0
e−rt
∫L
0
(G1 −G2)
2(m1 +m2)dx dt+ κ
∫T
0
e−rt(G¯1 − G¯2)
2 dt = 0.
In particular, G¯1 ≡ G¯2. We can then appeal to uniqueness for the Hamilton-Jacobi equa-
tion to get u1 ≡ u2 (cf. [26, Chapter V]). By (2.41), this entails that G1 ≡ G2, and so
m1 ≡ m2 by uniqueness for the Fokker-Planck equation. 
3. APPLICATION OF THE MFG APPROACH
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1.6. Namely, we show that the optimal
feedback strategy, computed from the MFG system (1.6), provides an ε-Nash equilibria
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for theN-Player Cournot game, where the error ε is arbitrarily small asN→∞. Through-
out this section (u,m) is the solution to (1.6) starting from some probability measurem0
satisfying (H2), and the function qu,m is given by (1.7). Moreover, we define
(3.1)
{
dXˆit = −qu,m(t, Xˆ
i
t)dt + σdW
i
t − dξ
Xˆi
t
Xi0 = Vi,
and set qˆit := qu,m(t, Xˆ
i
t). We recall that the objective functional is defined as
Ji,Nc (q
1, ...,qN) := E
{∫T
0
e−rs
(
1− κq¯is − q
i
s
)
qis1s<τi ds+ e
−rTuT (X
i
τi)
}
.
Our goal is to prove that
Ji,Nc
(
qi; (qˆj)j 6=i
)
6 ε+ Ji,Nc
(
qˆ1, ..., qˆN
)
∀qi ∈ Ac, ∀i = 1, . . . ,N
as long as N is large enough.
Let us set
τˆi := inf
{
t > 0 : Xˆit 6 0
}
∧ T ,
and define the following process:
(3.2) νˆNt :=
1
N
N∑
k=1
δ
Xˆkt
1t<τˆk , ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
where δx denotes the Dirac delta measure of the point x ∈ R. Observe that the above
definition makes sense because the stochastic dynamics (Xˆ1, ..., XˆN) exists in the strong
sense owing to Lemma 2.5. In particular, the strategy profile
(
qˆ1, ..., qˆN
)
defined in Theo-
rem 1.6 belongs to
∏N
i=1 Ac. Moreover, by using the probabilistic characterization (2.8c),
note that for any measurable and bounded function φ on Q¯we have
(3.3) E
[∫L
0
φdνˆNt
]
=
∫L
0
φdm(t), for a.e. t ∈ (0, T).
The above identity is not strong enough to show Theorem 1.6 and we need a stronger
condition (cf. (3.15)). Therefore, we need to work harder in order to get more information
on the asymptotic behavior of the empirical process (3.2) whenN→∞.
We aim to prove that the empirical process
(
νˆN
)
N>1
converges in law to the deterministic
measurem in a suitable function space, by using arguments borrowed from [23, 30]. For
this, we start by showing the existence of sub-sequences (νˆN
′
) that converges in law to
some limiting process ν∗. Then, we show that ν∗ belongs to P˜(Q¯) and satisfies the same
equation asm. Finally, we invoke the uniqueness of weak solutions to the Fokker-Planck
equation to deduce full weak convergence towardm.
The crucial step consists in showing that the sequence of the laws of
(
νˆN
)
N>1
is rel-
atively compact on a suitable topological space. This is where the machinery of [30]
is convenient. In order to use the analytical tools of that paper, we view the empirical
process as a random variable on the space of ca`dla`g (right continuous and has left-hand
limits) functions, mapping [0, T ] into the space of tempered distributions. This function
space is denotedDS ′
R
and is endowed with the so called Skorokhod’sM1 topology. Note
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that there are no measurability issues owing to [30, Proposition 2.7]. Moreover, by virtue
of [34], the process
(
νˆNt
)
t∈[0,T ]
has a version that is ca`dla`g in the strong topology of S ′R for
every N > 1, since νˆNt (φ) :=
∫
R
φdνˆNt is a real-valued ca`dla`g process, for every φ ∈ SR
and N > 1. We refer the reader to [30] for the construction of (DS ′
R
,M1), and to [38] for
general background on Skorokhod’s topologies. We shall denote by (DR,M1) the space of
R-valued ca`dla`g functions mapping [0, T ] to R, endowed with Skorokhod’sM1 topology.
The main strengths of working with the M1 topology in our context, are based on the
following facts:
• tightness on (DS ′
R
,M1) implies the relative compactness on (DS ′
R
,M1) thanks to
[30, Theorem 3.2]);
• the proof of tightness on (DS ′
R
,M1) is reduced through the canonical projection to
the study of tightness in (DR,M1), for which we have suitable characterizations
[30, 38];
• bounded monotone real-valued processes are automatically tight on (DR,M1);
this is an important feature, that enables to prove tightness of the sequence of
empirical process laws, by using a suitable decomposition.
It is also important to note that this approach could be generalized to deal with the case
of a systemic noise, by using a martingale approach as in [23, Lemma 5.9]. We do not
deal with that case in this paper.
More generally, one can replace S ′R by any dual space of a countably Hilbertian nuclear
space (cf. [30] and references therein). Although the class S ′R seems to be excessively large
for our purposes, we recover measure-valued processes bymeans of Riesz representation
theorem (cf. [23, Proposition 5.3] for an example in the same context).
Throughout this part, we shall use the symbol ⇒ to denote convergence in law. The key
technical lemma of this section is the following:
Lemma 3.1. As N → ∞, we have νˆN ⇒ m on (DS ′
R
,M1), i.e. for every continuous bounded
real-valued function Ψ on (DS ′
R
,M1), it holds that
lim
N
E
[
Ψ
(
νˆN
)]
= Ψ(m).
The bulk of this section is devoted to the proof of Lemma 3.1. The proof of Theorem
1.6 is completed in Section 3.2.
3.1. Proof of Lemma 3.1.
3.1.1. Tightness. At first, we aim to prove the tightness of (νˆN)N>1 on the space (DS ′
R
,M1);
that is, for every φ ∈ SR and for all ε > 0, there exists a compact subset K of (DR,M1)
such that:
P
(
νˆN(φ) ∈ K
)
> 1− ε for all N > 1.
For that purpose, we shall use a convenient characterization of tightness in (DR,M1) (cf.
[38, Theorem 12.12.3]).
We start by controlling the concentration of mass at the origin:
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Lemma 3.2. For every t ∈ [0, T ], we have
sup
N>1
EνˆNt (0, ε)→ 0, as ε→ 0.
Proof. Let us fix ε > 0. Note that, for every t ∈ [0, T ]
EνˆNt (0, ε) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
P
(
Xˆit ∈ (0, ε); t < τˆ
i
)
.
Thus, on the one hand
sup
N>1
EνˆN0 (0, ε) =
∫ε
0
dm0 → 0, as ε→ 0.
On the other hand, we have for any t ∈ (0, T ]
(3.4) sup
N>1
EνˆNt (0, ε) 6 sup
N>1
N−1
N∑
i=1
E
[
(1− φε(Xˆ
i
t))1t<τˆi
]
where φε is the cut-off function defined in (2.12). Thus, by virtue of (2.16) we obtain
sup
N>1
EνˆNt (0, ε) 6 C(L, t, ‖qu,m‖∞)ε1/4,
which entails the desired result. 
The second ingredient is the control of the mass loss increment:
Lemma 3.3. For every t ∈ [0, T ] and λ > 0
lim
h→0
lim sup
N
P
(∣∣η (νˆNt )− η (νˆNt+h)∣∣ > λ) = 0,
where the map µ→ η(µ) is defined in (2.2).
Proof. The proof is inspired by [23, Proposition 4.7]. Let ε,h > 0 and t ∈ [0, T ], we have
(3.5) P
(
η
(
νˆNt
)
− η
(
νˆNt+h
)
> λ
)
6 P
(
νˆNt (0, ε) > λ/2
)
+ P
(
η
(
νˆNt
)
− η
(
νˆNt+h
)
> λ; νˆNt (0, ε) < λ/2
)
.
The reason whywe use the latter decompositionwill be clear in (3.6). Owing toMarkov’s
inequality and Lemma 3.2, one has
lim sup
N
P(νˆNt (0, ε) > λ/2) 6 2λ
−1 sup
N
EνˆNt (0, ε)→ 0, as ε→ 0.
Nowwe deal with the second part in estimate (3.5). Define It to be the following random
set of indices:
It :=
{
1 6 i 6 N : Xˆit > ε
}
;
then, we have
P
(
η
(
νˆNt
)
− η
(
νˆNt+h
)
> λ; νˆNt (0, ε) < λ/2
)
6
∑
#I>N(1−λ/2)
P
(
η
(
νˆNt
)
− η
(
νˆNt+h
)
> λ | It = I)P(It = I
)
,
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where #I denotes the number of elements of I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,N}. Thus, we reduce the
problem to the estimation of the dynamics increments; using the same steps as for (2.9c)
we have
(3.6) P
(
η
(
νˆNt
)
− η
(
νˆNt+h
)
> λ | It = I
)
6 P
(
#
{
i ∈ I : inf
s∈[t,t+h]
Xˆis − Xˆ
i
t 6 −ε
}
> λN/2
∣∣∣ It = I
)
6 P
(
#
{
i ∈ I : sup
s∈[0,h]
Bis − inf
s∈[0,h]
Bis >
ε− h
σ
}
> λN/2
)
,
where we have used the uniform bound on qu,m of Lemma 2.5, and where (B
i)16i6N is
a family of independent Wiener processes. By symmetry, this final probability depends
only on #I, so that the right hand side above is maximized when I = {1, ...,N}. We infer
that
P
(
η
(
νˆNt
)
− η
(
νˆNt+h
)
> λ; νˆNt (0, ε) < λ/2
)
6 P
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
1{sups∈[0,h]Bis−infs∈[0,h]Bis>
ε−h
σ }
> λ/2
)
.
In the same way as for (2.9c), we choose ε(h) = h1/2 log(1/h) so that limh→0+ ε(h) = 0,
and use Markov’s inequality to get
P
(
η
(
νˆNt
)
− η
(
νˆNt+h
)
> λ; νˆNt (0, ε) < λ/2
)
6
4σ
λ(log(1/h) − h1/2)
.
This entails the desired result by taking the limit h→ 0+.
Now we deal with the case of a left hand limit. Let t ∈ (0, T ] and h 7→ ε(h) as defined
above. Using a similar decomposition as before, we have for small enough h > 0
P
(
η
(
νˆNt−h
)
− η
(
νˆNt
)
> λ
)
6 P
(
νˆNt−h(0, ε) > λ/2
)
+ P
(
η
(
νˆNt−h
)
− η
(
νˆNt
)
> λ; νˆNt−h(0, ε) < λ/2
)
.
Appealing toMarkov’s inequality, estimate (3.4), and estimate (2.16) of Section 2, we have
for small enough h > 0
P
(
νˆNt−h(0, ε) > λ/2
)
6 2λ−1EνˆNt−h(0, ε) 6 2Cλ
−1
(
1− e−π
2t/8L2
)−1/4
ε1/4,
whence
lim
h→0+
lim sup
N
P
(
νˆNt−h(0, ε(h)) > λ/2
)
= 0.
On the other hand, we show by using the same steps as in (3.6) that
P
(
η
(
νˆNt−h
)
− η
(
νˆNt
)
> λ; νˆNt−h(0, ε) < λ/2
)
6
4σ
λ(log(1/h) − h1/2)
.
This entails the desired result by taking the limit h→ 0+. 
We are now in position to show tightness on (DS ′
R
,M1).
Proposition 3.4 (Tightness). The sequence of the laws of (νˆN)N>1 is tight on the space (DS ′
R
,M1).
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Proof. We present a brief sketch to explain the main arguments, and refer to [23, Proposi-
tion 5.1] for a similar proof.
Thanks to [30, Theorem 3.2], it is enough to show that the sequence of the laws of(
νˆN(φ)
)
N>1
is tight on (DR,M1) for anyφ ∈ SR. To prove this, one can use the conditions
of [38, Theorem 12.12.3], which can be rewritten in a convenient form by virtue of [2].
From [30, Proposition 4.1] , we are done if we achieve the two following steps:
(1) find α,β, c > 0, such that
P
(
HR
(
νˆNt1(φ), νˆ
N
t2
(φ), νˆNt3(φ)
)
> λ
)
6 cλ−α|t3 − t1|
1+β,
for any N > 1, λ > 0 and 0 6 t1 < t2 < t3 6 T , where
HR (x1, x2, x3) := inf
06γ61
|x2 − (1− γ)x1 − γx3| for x1, x2, x3 ∈ R;
(2) show that
lim
h→0+
lim
N
P
(
sup
t∈(0,h)
|νˆNt (φ) − νˆ
N
0 (φ)| + sup
t∈(T−h,T)
|νˆNT (φ) − νˆ
N
t (φ)| > λ
)
= 0.
The key step is to consider the following decomposition [30, Proposition 4.2]:
(3.7) ν¯Nt (φ) :=
1
N
N∑
k=1
φ(Xˆkt∧τˆk) = νˆ
N
t (φ) + φ(0)E
N
t ,
where
ENt := 1− η
(
νˆNt
)
is the exit rate process, which quantifies the fraction of firms out ofmarket. Since
(
ENt
)
t∈[0,T ]
is monotone increasing we have
inf
06γ61
∣∣ENt2 − (1− γ)ENt1 − γENt3 ∣∣ = 0,
so that
HR
(
νˆNt1(φ), νˆ
N
t2
(φ), νˆNt3(φ)
)
6
∣∣ν¯Nt1(φ) − ν¯Nt2(φ)∣∣ + ∣∣ν¯Nt2(φ) − ν¯Nt3(φ)∣∣ .
Thus, by virtue of Markov’s inequality
P
(
HR
(
νˆNt1(φ), νˆ
N
t2
(φ), νˆNt3(φ)
)
> λ
)
6 8λ−4
(
E
∣∣ν¯Nt1(φ) − ν¯Nt2(φ)∣∣4 + E ∣∣ν¯Nt2(φ) − ν¯Nt3(φ)∣∣4) .
Therefore, we deduce requirement (1) from the following estimate:
(3.8) ∀s, t ∈ [0, T ],
E
∣∣ν¯Nt (φ) − ν¯Ns (φ)∣∣4 6 ‖φx‖4∞ 1N
N∑
k=1
E|Xˆkt∧τˆk − Xˆ
k
s∧τˆk |
4
6 C‖φx‖
4∞|t − s|2;
where we have used Ho¨lder’s inequality and the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality
[37, Thm IV.42.1].
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The second requirement is also obtained by using the latter estimate, decomposition
(3.7), and Lemma 3.3. In fact, we have
P
(
sup
t∈(0,h)
|νˆNt (φ) − νˆ
N
0 (φ)| > λ
)
6 P
(
sup
t∈(0,h)
|ν¯Nt (φ) − ν¯
N
0 (φ)| > λ/2
)
+ P
(
|φ(0)|ENh > λ/2
)
,
so that the desired result follows thanks to (3.8), and Lemma 3.3. By the same way, we
deal with the second term P
(
supt∈(T−h,T) |νˆ
N
T (φ) − νˆ
N
t (φ)| > λ
)
. 
3.1.2. Full convergence. We arrive now at the final ingredient for the proof of Lemma 3.1.
Let us set
Ctest :=
{
φ ∈ C∞c ([0, T) × Q¯) ∣∣ φ(t, 0) = φx(t,L) = 0, ∀t ∈ (0, T)} .
We start by deriving an equation for (νˆNt )t∈[0,T ].
Proposition 3.5. For every N > 1 and φ ∈ Ctest, it holds that∫L
0
φ(0, .)dνˆN0 =
∫T
0
∫L
0
(
−φt −
σ2
2
φxx + qu,mφx
)
dνˆNs ds+ IN(φ) a.s.,
where
IN(φ) := −
σ
N
N∑
k=1
∫T
0
φx
(
s, Xˆks
)
1s<τˆk dW
k
s .
Proof. Let us consider φ ∈ Ctest. First observe that for any k ∈ {1, ...,N}, and t ∈ [0, T ]
Xˆkt∧τˆk = Vk −
∫ t
0
qˆks1s<τqˆk ds+ σW
k
t∧τqˆ
k − ξ
Xˆk
t .
Hence, for any k ∈ {1, ...,N}, the random process
(
Xˆk
t∧τˆk
)
t∈[0,T ]
is a continuous semi-
martingale, and by applying Itoˆ’s rule we have:
φ(T , Xˆkτˆk) − φ(0,Vk) +
∫T
0
φx
(
s, Xˆks∧τˆk
)
dξXˆ
k
s
=
∫T
0
{
σ2
2
φxx(s, Xˆ
k
s ) − qu,m(s, Xˆ
k
s )φx(s, Xˆ
k
s )
}
1s<τˆk ds
+
∫T
0
φt
(
s, Xˆks∧τˆk
)
ds+ σ
∫T
0
φx
(
s, Xˆks
)
1s<τˆk dW
k
s .
By using the boundary conditions satisfied by φ, and noting that φt(t, 0) = 0 for any
t ∈ (0, T), we deduce that
− φ(0,Vk) − σ
∫T
0
φx
(
s, Xˆks
)
1s<τˆk dW
k
s
=
∫T
0
{
φt
(
s, Xˆks
)
+
σ2
2
φxx
(
s, Xˆks
)
− qu,m(s, Xˆ
k
s )φx
(
s, Xˆks
)}
1s<τˆk ds
The desired result follows by summing over k ∈ {1, ...,N}, and multiplying by N−1. 
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By virtue of [30, Theorem 3.2], the tightness of the sequence of laws of (νˆN)N>1 en-
sures that this sequence is relatively compact on (DS ′
R
,M1). Consequently, Proposition
3.4 entails the existence of a subsequence (still denoted (νˆN)N>1) such that
νˆN ⇒ νˆ∗, on (DS ′
R
,M1).
Thanks to [30, Proposition 2.7 (i)],
∀φ ∈ SR, νˆ
N(φ)⇒ νˆ∗(φ), asN→∞, on (DR,M1).
To avoid possible confusion about multiple distinct limit points, we will denote νˆ∗
any limiting processes that realizes one of these limiting laws. First, we note that νˆ∗ is a
P˜(Q¯)-valued process:
Proposition 3.6. For every t ∈ [0, T ], νˆ∗t is almost surely supported on Q¯ and belongs to P˜(Q¯).
Proof. This follows from the “Portmanteau theorem” and the Riesz representation theo-
rem. We omit the details and refer to [23, Proposition 5.3]. 
Next, we recover the partial differential equation satisfied by the process (νˆ∗t)t∈[0,T ].
Lemma 3.7. For every φ ∈ Ctest, it holds that∫L
0
φ(0, .)dm0 +
∫T
0
∫L
0
(
φt +
σ2
2
φxx − qu,mφx
)
dνˆ∗s ds = 0 a.s.
Proof. Let us consider φ ∈ Ctest and set:
µ(φ) :=
∫L
0
φ(0, .)dm0 +
∫T
0
∫L
0
(
φt +
σ2
2
φxx − qu,mφx
)
dνˆ∗s ds;
and
µN(φ) :=
∫L
0
φ(0, .)dm0 +
∫T
0
∫L
0
(
φt +
σ2
2
φxx − qu,mφx
)
dνˆNs ds.
Owing to Proposition 3.5 we have
µN(φ) = IN(φ) +
∫L
0
φ(0, .)d(m0 − νˆ
N
0 ).
Note that
EIN(φ)
2
6 C‖φx‖
2∞N−1.
Hence, by appealing to Horowitz-Karandikar inequality (see e.g. [36, Theorem 10.2.1])
we deduce that
Eµ2N(φ) 6 C‖φx‖
2∞N−2/5.
Consequently, to conclude the proof it is enough to show that
µN(φ)⇒ µ(φ) asN→∞.
Let A be the set of elements in DS ′
R
that take values in P˜(Q¯), and consider a sequence
(ψN) ⊂ A which converges to some ψ in A with respect to theM1 topology. Let qu,m be
a continuous function on [0, T ]× R, which satisfies the following conditions:
(3.9a)
qu,m|QT
≡ qu,m; ‖qu,m‖∞ = ‖qu,m‖∞; ∀t ∈ [0, T ], supp qu,m(t, .) ⊂ (−L, 2L).
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We also define the sequence
(3.9b) qnu,m(t, x) := (qu,m(t, .) ∗ ξn) (x), n > 1,
where ξn(x) := nξ(nx) is a compactly supported mollifier on R.
We have
J :=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫T
0
∫L
0
qu,mφx dψ
N
s ds−
∫T
0
∫L
0
qu,mφx dψs ds
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫T
0
∫
R
qu,mφx dψ
N
s ds−
∫T
0
∫
R
qu,mφx dψs ds
∣∣∣∣∣
6 2‖φx‖∞ ∥∥qnu,m − qu,m∥∥∞
+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫T
0
∫
R
qnu,mφx d(ψ
N
s −ψs)ds
∣∣∣∣∣ =: J1 + J2.
Since qnu,m(s, .)φx(s, .) ∈ SR for any s ∈ [0, T ], then J2 vanishes as ψ
N → ψ . On the other
hand, note that J1 also vanishes as n→ +∞ so that we obtain limN J = 0. Moreover, one
easily checks that∫T
0
∫L
0
FdψNs ds→
∫T
0
∫L
0
Fdψs ds, F ≡ φt,φxx as N→ +∞.
Therefore, by virtue of the continuous mapping theorem, we obtain that µN(φ) ⇒ µ(φ),
which concludes the proof. 
We are now in position to prove Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. From Lemma 3.7, we know that d˚∗ = dνˆ∗t dt and dm = dm(t)dt
both satisfy (almost surely) the same Fokker-Planck equation in the sense of measures (cf.
Appendix B). By invoking the uniqueness of solutions to that equation (cf. Proposition
B.1), we deduce that νˆ∗ ≡ m almost surely. Since all converging sub-sequences converge
weakly towardm, we infer that νˆN ⇒ m, on (DS ′
R
,M1). 
3.2. Proof of Theorem 1.6. We start by collecting the following technical result whose
proof is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 3.8. Fix n > 1, define A to be all elements inDS ′
R
that take values in P˜(Q¯), and let Ψm
(resp. Ψnq ) be the map defined from DS ′R into DS ′R (resp. from A into DR) such that
Ψm(ν)(t) := ν(t) −m(t) and Ψ
n
q (ν)(t) :=
∣∣∣∣
∫
R
qnu,m(t, .)dν(t)
∣∣∣∣ .
Then Ψm,Ψ
n
q are continuous with respect to the M1 topology.
Let us now explain the proof of Theorem 1.6. We shall proceed by contradiction, as-
suming that (1.10) does not hold. Then there exists ε0 > 0, a sequence of integersNk such
that limkNk = +∞, and sequences (ik) ⊂ {1, ...,Nk}, (qik) ⊂ Ac, such that
(3.10) Jik,Nkc
(
qik ; (qˆj)j 6=ik
)
> ε0 + J
ik,Nk
c
(
qˆ1, ..., qˆN
)
, ∀k > 0.
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We derive a contradiction by estimating the difference between Jik,Nkc and the mean field
objective Jc, which we recall from Section 1.2:
(3.11)
Jc(ρ) := E
{∫T
0
e−rs (1− κq¯s − ρs)ρs1s<τρ ds+ e
−rTuT
(
X
ρ
T
)}
, q¯ =
∫L
0
qu,m dm
where
dX
ρ
t = −ρt1t<τρ dt+ σ1t<τρ dWt − dξ
Xρ
t .
Using Lemma 3.1, we will show that this difference goes to zero asNk → +∞.
Let us set for any k > 0,
 dX
ik
t := −q
ik
t dt+ σdW
ik
t − dξ
Xik
t , X
ik
0 = Vik ,
τik := inf{t > 0 : Xikt 6 0} ∧ T ,
and define
Zk1,T :=
∫T
0
qiks 1s<τik ds, and Z
k
2,T :=
∫T
0
∣∣qiks ∣∣2 1s<τik ds.
Recall that all elements of Ac are non-negative, so that Z
k
1,T > 0 for any k > 0. We start
by collecting estimates on
(
Z
ik
1,T
)
k>0
and
(
Z
ik
2,T
)
k>0
. Observe that for any t ∈ [0, T ],
Xik
t∧τik
= Vk −
∫ t
0
qiks 1s<τik ds+ σW
ik
t∧τik
− ξX
ik
t , ∀k > 0.
Since the local time is nondecreasing, we infer that
0 6 Zk1,T 6 Vik − X
ik
τik
+ σWik
τik
, ∀k > 0
holds almost surely. By means of the optional stopping theorem, we deduce that
(3.12) sup
k>0
E
[
Zk1,T
]
6 L.
Moreover, recall that
Jik,Nkc
(
qik ; (qˆj)j 6=ik
)
= E
{∫T
0
e−rs
(
1− κqˆs
ik
− qiks
)
qiks 1s<τik ds+ e
−rTuT (X
ik
τik
)
}
,
where for any k > 0
qˆs
ik
=
1
Nk − 1
∑
j 6=ik
qu,m(s, Xˆ
j
s)1s<τˆj .
Thus, for any k > 0
e−rTE
[
Zk2,T
]
6 ‖uT‖∞ + E
{∫T
0
e−rs
∣∣∣1− κqˆsik∣∣∣qiks 1s<τik ds
}
− Jik,Nkc
(
qik ; (qˆj)j 6=ik
)
.
By virtue of (3.10) and the uniform bound on qu,m that is given in (2.22), we deduce that
e−rTE
[
Zk2,T
]
6 2‖uT ‖∞ + (κ+ 1) sup
k>0
E
[
Zk1,T
]
+ C(κ, T),
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so that
(3.13) sup
k>0
E
[
Zk2,T
]
6 C(T ,κ, ‖uT ‖∞,L).
On the other hand, we have for any k > 0,
Jik,Nkc
(
qik ; (qˆj)j 6=ik
)
6 E
{∫T
0
e−rs
(
1− κ
∫L
0
qu,m(s, .)dνˆ
Nk
s − q
ik
s
)
qiks 1s<τik ds+ e
−rTuT (X
ik
τik
)
}
+ κ
(
Nk
Nk − 1
− 1
)
+
κ
Nk
sup
k>0
E
[
Z
ik
1,T
]
.
Thus, for any k > 0
Jik,Nkc
(
qik ; (qˆj)j 6=ik
)
− Jc(q
ik) − CN−1k
6 κE
[∫T
0
e−rsqiks 1s<τqik
∣∣∣∣
∫
R
qu,m(s, .)d
(
m(s) − νˆNks
)∣∣∣∣ ds
]
6 κE
[∫T
0
e−rsqiks 1s<τqik
∣∣∣∣
∫
R
qnu,m(s, .)d
(
m(s) − νˆNks
)∣∣∣∣ ds
]
+ κE
[∫T
0
e−rsqiks 1s<τqik
ds
]∥∥qnu,m − qu,m∥∥∞ ,
where Jc is given by (3.11) and qu,m, q
n
u,m are given by (3.9a)-(3.9b).
Let us fix ε > 0. Since
(
qnu,m
)
n>1
converges uniformly toward qu,m on [0, T ] × R, we
can choose n large enough and independently of k > 0 so that
(3.14) Jik,Nkc
(
qik ; (qˆj)j 6=ik
)
− Jc(q
ik)
6 κE
[
Zk2,T
]1/2
E
[∫T
0
∣∣∣∣
∫
R
qnu,m(s, .)d
(
νˆNks −m(s)
)∣∣∣∣
2
ds
]1/2
+ κεE
[
Zk1,T
]
+ CN−1k .
Appealing to Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.8 and the continuous mapping theorem we have
(3.15) lim
N
E
[∫T
0
∣∣∣∣
∫
R
qnu,m(s, .)d
(
νˆNks −m(s)
)∣∣∣∣
2
ds
]
= 0.
Thus, by combining (3.12), (3.13), and (3.14):
Jik,Nkc
(
qik ; (qˆj)j 6=ik
)
− Jc(q
ik) 6 C(T ,κ, ‖uT ‖∞,L)ε
for big enough k > 0. Whence, by means of Lemma 1.4:
Jik,Nkc
(
qik ; (qˆj)j 6=ik
)
6 C(T ,κ, ‖uT ‖∞,L)ε + Jc(ρ∗)
for big enough k > 0. In the same manner, one can show that
Jc(ρ
∗) 6 Cε+ Jik,Nkc
(
qˆ1, ..., qˆN
)
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holds for big enough k > 0. Hence, going back to (3.10) and using the above estimates,
we obtain
ε0 < C(T ,κ, ‖uT ‖∞,L)ε.
We deduce the desired contradiction by choosing ε suitably small.
APPENDIX A. PROOFS OF SOME ELEMENTARY OR TECHNICAL RESULTS
We start by giving a proof to Lemma 1.4.
Proof of Lemma 1.4. This kind of verification results is standard: one checks that the can-
didate optimal control is indeed the maximum using the equation satisfied by u; which
is the value function. Let ρ be an admissible control (F-adapted and satisfying the con-
straints). Since the local time is monotone, then Xρ is a semimartingale and with the use
of Itoˆ’s rule we obtain
E
[
e−rTuT
(
X
ρ
τρ
)]
=
E
[
u(0,X
ρ
0 ) +
∫τρ
0
e−rs
{
ut(s,X
ρ
s ) − ru(s,X
ρ
s ) − ρsux(s,X
ρ
s ) +
σ2
2
uxx(s,X
ρ
s )
}
ds
]
= E
[
u(0,X
ρ
0 ) −
∫τρ
0
e−rs
{
q2u,m(s,X
ρ
s ) + ρsux(s,X
ρ
s )
}
ds
]
,
wherewe have used the boundary value problem satisfied byu and the fact thatut,ux,uxx
are continuous on (0, T)× (0,L] (cf. (2.34)).
By using definition (1.7), note that
q2u,m =
1
4
|(1− κq¯ − ux)∨ 0|
2
= sup
ρ>0
ρ(1− κq¯ − ρ− ux) = qu,m(1− κq¯− qu,m − ux).
Therefore
E
[
e−rTuT
(
X
ρ
τρ
)]
6 E
[
u(0,X
ρ
0 ) −
∫τρ
0
e−rsρs(1− κq¯ − ρs)ds
]
,
so that∫L
0
u(0, .)dm0 = E
[
u(0,X
ρ
0 )
]
> E
[∫τρ
0
e−rs(1− κq¯ − ρs)ρs ds+ e
−rTuT
(
X
ρ
τρ
)]
.
By virtue of Lemma 2.5, we know that the process (Xρ
∗
t )t∈[0,T ] exists in the strong sense.
Replacing ρ by ρ∗ in the above computations, inequalities become equalities and we eas-
ily infer that
Jc(ρ
∗) =
∫L
0
u(0, .)dm0.
Thus (1.8) is proved. 
Next, we give a proof to Lemma 3.8.
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Proof of Lemma 3.8. Throughout the proof, we shall use notations of [30, 38].
Step 1 (continuity in S ′R): By virtue of Theorem 1.5, we know that t→ m(t) is continuous
on [0, T ] with respect to the strong topology of S ′R. Let φ ∈ S
′
R, we aim to compute the
modulus of continuity of t →
∫
R
φdm(t). For this, we shall appeal to the probabilistic
characterization (2.10), thanks to Remark 2.4. We have for any h > 0
(A.1)
∣∣∣∣
∫
R
φd(m(t+ h) −m(t))
∣∣∣∣ 6 E |φ(Xt+h)1t+h<τ − φ(Xt)1t<τ|
6 C‖φ‖C1 (P(t < τ) − P(t+ h < τ) + E |Xt+h − Xt|) .
Following the same steps as for (2.9a)-(2.9c), and using Burkholder-Davis-Gundy in-
equality, we obtain for small enough h > 0∣∣∣∣
∫
R
φd(m(t + h) −m(t))
∣∣∣∣ 6 C‖φ‖C1ωm(h),
where
ωm(h) := h
1/2 +
(
log(1/h) − h1/2
)−1
+ sup
s∈[0,T ]
∫L
0
(1− φh1/2 log(1/h)(x))m(s, x)dx,
and φǫ is the cut-off function defined in (2.12). In order to get limh→0+ ωm(h) = 0, we
need to prove that
lim
h→0+
sup
s∈[0,T ]
∫L
0
(1− φh1/2 log(1/h)(x))m(s, x)dx = 0.
This ensues easily from Dini’s Lemma, by choosing the sequence (φǫ)ǫ>0 to be mono-
tonically increasing.
Step 2 (continuity of Ψm): Let ǫ > 0, x,y ∈ DS ′
R
, B be any bounded subset of SR, and
λx := (zx, tx), λy := (zy, ty) be a parametric representations of the graphs of x and y
respectively, such that
gB(λx, λy) := sup
s∈[0,1]
pB(zx(s) − zy(s)) ∨ |tx(s) − ty(s)| 6 ǫ,
where pB(ν) := supx∈B |ν(x)|. Note that λx, λy depend on ǫ, but we do not use the
subscript ǫ in order to simplify the notation. We have
gB(λx, λy) > sup
s∈[0,1]
pB (zx(s) −m(tx(s)) − zy(s) +m(ty(s))) ∨ |tx(s) − ty(s)|
− sup
s∈[0,1]
maxpB(m(tx(s)) −m(ty(s))) ∨ |tx(s) − ty(s)| .
Since the map t→ m(t) ∈ S ′R is continuous, observe that
λ ′v : s→ (zv(s) −m(tv(s)), tv(s)) , v ≡ x,y
is a parametric representation of the graph
γ ′v :=
{
(w, t) ∈ S ′R × [0, T ] : w ∈
[
v(t−) −m(t), v(t) −m(t)
]}
, v ≡ x,y.
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Consequently
(A.2)
dB,M1 (Ψm(x),Ψm(y)) 6 gB(λx, λy) + sup
s∈[0,1]
pB(m(tx(s)) −m(ty(s))) ∨ |tx(s) − ty(s)|
6 2ǫ + sup
s∈[0,1]
pB(m(tx(s)) −m(ty(s))).
Hence, by using the estimation of Step 1, we infer that:
(A.3) dB,M1 (Ψm(x),Ψm(y)) 6 C(B)ωm(ǫ),
which in turn implies that Ψm is continuous.
Step 3 (continuity of Ψnq ): Let us fix n > 1. Note that q
n
u,m maps [0, T ] into SR, and the
following holds:
(A.4) sup
t∈[0,T ]
sup
x∈R
∣∣xα∂βx qnu,m(t, x)∣∣ 6 C(L,α)nβ
∫
R
∣∣∂βxξ(y)∣∣ dy, ∀α,β ∈ N.
Owing to (A.4), we have qnu,m([0, T ]) ⊂ Bn, where Bn is a bounded subset of SR. Let
ǫ > 0, x,y ∈ A, and λx := (zx, tx), λy := (zy, ty) be a parametric representations of the
graphs of x and y respectively such that
gBn(λx, λy) 6 ǫ.
We have
gBn(λx, λy) > sup
s∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣∣
∫L
0
qnu,m(tx(s), .)d(zx(s) − zy(s))
∣∣∣∣∣ ∨ |tx(s) − ty(s)|
> sup
s∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣∣
∫L
0
qnu,m(tx(s), .)dzx(s) −
∫L
0
qnu,m(ty(s), .)dzy(s)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∨ |tx(s) − ty(s)|
− sup
s∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣∣
∫L
0
(
qnu,m(tx(s), .) − q
n
u,m(ty(s), .)
)
dzy(s)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∨ |tx(s) − ty(s)| .
Thus, it holds that
sup
s∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣∣
∫L
0
qnu,m(tx(s), .)dzx(s) −
∫L
0
qnu,m(ty(s), .)dzy(s)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∨ |tx(s) − ty(s)|
6 2ǫ+ sup
s∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣∣
∫L
0
(
qnu,m(tx(s), .) − q
n
u,m(ty(s), .)
)
dzy(s)
∣∣∣∣∣ 6 2ǫ +ωn2 (ǫ).
whereωn2 is the continuity modulus of q
n
u,m. By noting that
λ ′′v : s→
(∫L
0
qnu,m(tv(s), .)dzv(s), tv(s)
)
, v ≡ x,y
is a parametric representation of the graph
γ ′′v :=
{
(w, t) ∈ S ′R × [0, T ] : w ∈
[∫L
0
qnu,m(t, .)dv(t
−),
∫L
0
qnu,m(t, .)dv(t)
]}
, v ≡ x,y,
36 P. JAMESON GRABER AND CHARAFEDDINE MOUZOUNI
we deduce that
dM1
(
Ψnq (x),Ψ
n
q (y)
)
6 2ǫ +ωn2 (ǫ).
The proof is complete. 
APPENDIX B. ON UNIQUENESS FOR SOLUTIONS OF FOKKER-PLANCK EQUATIONS
In this part, we show that problem (1.2a)-(1.2b) admits at most one weak solution in a
wide class of positive Radon measures. We believe that this result is well-known, and we
explain the proof for lack of precise reference.
Let us start by generalizing the notion of weak solution that is given in (1.2c). For any
m0 ∈ P(Q¯), we define a measure-valued weak solution to (1.2a)-(1.2b) to be a measurem on
QT of the type
dm = dm(t)dt,
withm(t) ∈ P˜(Q¯) for all t ∈ [0, T ], and t→ m(t,A) measurable on [0, T ] for any Borel set
A ⊂ Q¯; such that
‖b‖2L2m :=
∫T
0
∫L
0
|b|2 dm <∞
and
(B.1)
∫T
0
∫L
0
(−φt −
σ2
2
φxx + bφx)dm =
∫L
0
φ(0, .)dm0
for every φ ∈ Ctest. We claim that such a solution is unique:
Proposition B.1. There is at most one measure-valued weak solution to (1.2a)-(1.2b).
Proof. Our approach is similar to [35, Section 3.1]. Letm be a measure-valued weak solu-
tion to (1.2a)-(1.2b), and consider the following dual problem:
(B.2)


−wt −
σ2
2
wxx + bwx = ψ in QT ,
w(t, 0) = wx(t,L) = 0 in (0, T),
w(T , x) = 0 in Q,
where ψ,b ∈ C∞(QT ). Let w be a smooth solution to (B.2). Since w2 is smooth, we have:∫T
0
∫L
0
{
−(w2)t −
σ2
2
(w2)xx + b(w
2)x
}
dm =
∫L
0
w2(0, .)dm0.
By (B.2) we thus have∫T
0
∫L
0
w(ψ− bwx)dm−
σ2
2
∫T
0
∫L
0
|wx|
2 dm+
σ2
2
∫T
0
∫L
0
bwwx dm =
∫L
0
w2(0, .)dm0,
so that
σ2
4
∫T
0
∫L
0
|wx|
2 dm 6 C
(
‖w‖2∞
∫T
0
∫L
0
|b− b|2 dm+ ‖ψ‖∞‖w‖∞
)
.
Hence, from the maximum principle:
(B.3)
∫T
0
∫L
0
|wx|
2 dm 6 C‖ψ‖2∞
(
1+ ‖b− b‖2L2m
)
.
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Now, letm1,m2 be two measure-valued weak solutions to (1.2a)-(1.2b). We know that
b ∈ L2m1(QT ) ∩ L
2
m2
(QT ).
Thus, b ∈ L2m(QT ), where m = m1 +m2. Let b
ǫ be a sequence of smooth functions con-
verging to b in L2m(QT ). Since m is regular, note that such a sequence exists by density of
smooth functions in L2m(QT ). The measures m1,m2 being positive, b
ǫ converges toward
b in L2m1(QT ) ∩ L
2
m2
(QT ) as well. Now, let us consider w
ǫ to be a solution to the dual
problem that is obtained by replacing b by bǫ in (B.2). By using wǫ as a test function, we
obtain
(B.4)
∫T
0
∫L
0
ψ d(m1 −m2) =
∫T
0
∫L
0
(b − bǫ)wǫx dm2 −
∫T
0
∫L
0
(b− bǫ)wǫx dm1 =: I
ǫ
2 − I
ǫ
1 .
By virtue of (B.3), we have for j = 1, 2:
‖wǫx‖L2mj
6 C‖ψ‖∞
(
1+ ‖b− bǫ‖L2mj
)
6 C,
so that ∣∣Iǫj ∣∣ 6 ‖wǫx‖L2mj‖b− bǫ‖L2mj 6 C‖b − bǫ‖L2mj → 0, as ǫ→ 0.
Consequently, for any smooth function ψ∫T
0
∫L
0
ψ d(m1 −m2) = 0,
which entails m1 ≡ m2 and concludes the proof. 
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